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NC Regulatory Sandbox Act: Encouraging Innovation
Despite Missing Some Opportunities
I. INTRODUCTION
In a perfect world, economic regulations would always achieve
their intended goals, such as protecting consumers and the economy from
dishonest or risky activities. But in the world we live in, regulations are
often fallible constructions that reflect the imperfections of the humans
who wrote them. Of course, they cannot be eliminated altogether. The
costs of removing regulations entirely would far outweigh the benefits.1
This reality has led governments around the world to experiment with an
alternative to this seemingly two-sided choice: the regulatory sandbox.
A regulatory sandbox is a legislative construct that gives
companies a fixed period of time in which to test novel financial products
without being subject to full government regulation.2 Proponents of
regulatory sandboxes see them as an essential response to the everincreasing pace of technological innovation.3 Critics view them with a
wary eye, arguing that sandboxes can enable the opportunistic and
predatory practices that existing regulations seek to prevent in the first

1. PEW CHARITABLE TR., Government Regulation: Costs Lower, Benefits Greater
Than Industry Estimates (May 26, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/fact-sheets/2015/05/government-regulation-costs-lower-benefits-greater-thanindustry-estimates [https://perma.cc/V6F9-AKNG].
2. Thomas A. Hemphill, How State ‘Regulatory Sandboxes’ are Laboratories for
Innovation, THE NAT’L INT. (June 13, 2021), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-state%E2%80%98regulatory-sandboxes%E2%80%99-are-laboratories-innovation-187259
[https://perma.cc/QZ5P-KQ32].
3. See Cristina Rosemberg et al., Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Testbeds:
Final Report, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK (2020),
https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Regulatory-Sandboxes-andInnovation-Testbeds-A-Look-at-International-Experience-in-Latin-America-and-theCaribbean.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPT3-X585] (discussing how the “pacing problem” of
regulation “has never been more prevalent due to the nature and speed of digital
transformation and innovation,” and suggesting that “[r]egulators can . . . play a more active
role in nurturing and supporting innovation by exploring the application of regulatory
sandboxes”).
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place.4 The truth is that sandboxes can do both of these things, and the
details of a particular regulatory scheme will determine its efficacy.5
On October 15, 2021, Governor Roy Cooper signed into law the
North Carolina Regulatory Sandbox Act (“N.C. Act”) which established
a regulatory sandbox in North Carolina.6 The N.C. Act is an essential
first step towards making institutional changes and will ensure that
financial, banking, and insurance companies doing business in North
Carolina can innovate safely under minimal regulatory restriction.7 The
Act will help position North Carolina as one of the leading states with
regard to attracting financial, insurance, and blockchain innovators.8
While the N.C. Act is a step in the right direction, the North
Carolina legislature missed an opportunity to capitalize on lessons
learned in other jurisdictions where sandboxes are already in effect.9
Since it is unlikely that the Act will be amended so shortly after its
passage, there are two alternative approaches to correcting any
deficiencies. The “Innovation Council,” an entity established by the N.C.
Act to administer the sandbox, could first make minor adjustments as it
rolls out the program, although these changes must be limited to
4. See Lee Reiners, North Carolina’s Proposed Regulatory Sandbox Needs Work,
DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF L.: THE FINREG BLOG (May 28, 2019),
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2019/05/28/north-carolinas-proposed-regulatorysandbox-needs-work/ [https://perma.cc/F57P-6V39] (recognizing that “[t]here is nothing
inherently wrong with a state promoting specific industries in furtherance of economic
growth… [t]he problem with this approach, when it has historically been applied to financial
services, is that it can lead to consumer abuses and potentially, more widespread economic
harm” - the reduction in mortgage lending regulations leading up to the financial crisis is a
good example).
5. See infra Part VIII.
6. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act, ch. 169, 2021 N.C. Sess. Ls.,
https://ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2021-2022/SL2021-166.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LW6H-MBNH].
7. Andrea O’Sullivan, Expanding Regulatory Sandboxes to Fast-Track Innovation,
JAMES MADISON INST. (Jan. 2021), https://www.jamesmadison.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/Regulatory_Sandbox_1.27.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN6R-TQ5K]
(defining a regulatory sandbox as an environment in which “innovative companies may
safely experiment under the watch and guidance of regulatory agencies”).
8. See Richard B. Levin et al., Hardly Child’s Play: North Carolina Joins the
Growing Number of States with a Fintech Regulatory Sandbox, NELSON MULLINS: IDEA
EXCH. (Oct. 19, 2021), https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/Fintechnostradamus/fn-in-the-news/hardly-child-s-play-north-carolina-joins-the-growing-numberof-states-with-a-Fintech-regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/RCF9-LLCS] (recognizing
that N.C. recently became the tenth state to offer a regulatory sandbox, and that sandboxes
can “pave the way for a more attractive and predictable marketplace for developing new
FinTech solutions”).
9. See Reiners, supra note 4 (criticizing an earlier version of the N.C. Act and
recommending changes based on existing sandboxes).
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discretionary details that are under the Council’s control.10 With regard
to bigger changes, the Council could implement the sandbox as-written
for a period of two years and then recommend a set of refinements to the
General Assembly. This will enable the program to operate unchanged
for the benefit of any participants and also give the Council plenty of time
to evaluate which substantive changes may be needed. Allowing the
Innovation Council to tinker with the program is consistent with the
experimental nature of the sandbox idea itself.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a background
of regulatory sandboxes, a procedural history of the regulatory sandbox
concept in North Carolina, and the specific provisions of the N.C. Act.11
Part III examines the myriad benefits that will result from the Act, and
addresses some general critiques that the Act is vulnerable to.12 Part IV
addresses criticisms the N.C. Act is vulnerable to, and Part V forecasts a
number of changes that will likely improve the effectiveness of the N.C.
Act, whether they are effectuated by the Council itself or through
subsequent amendments of the statute by the General Assembly.13 Part
VI concludes that while the Act as-written has some important benefits,
it could function much more effectively by incorporating what other
jurisdictions have learned over the years.14
II. HISTORY OF REGULATORY SANDBOXES AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE N.C. ACT
A regulatory sandbox is a government program which allows
companies to operate for a limited period of time without being subject
to the full ambit of regulations that would normally apply.15 Regulators
developed these sandboxes in order to influence economic activity

10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19 (2011) (prohibiting an agency from adopting
rules that interpret a law unless the law specifically authorizes an agency to do so).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV-V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-1(b)(11) (defining regulatory sandbox
as a program that “permits a person or entity to temporarily test an innovative financial or
insurance product or service and make it available to consumers on a limited basis without
being subject to certain licensing or other regulatory obligations imposed under applicable
State law”).
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outside traditional channels.16 Adjusting the regulatory regime can be a
powerful tool for the government to guide economic policy and
incentivize certain activity.17
The general goal of N.C. Act’s program is to support innovation
and job creation in North Carolina by allowing companies to experiment
and iterate with innovative products and services.18 The program also
intends to give regulators the experience they need to modernize North
Carolina’s banking and insurance laws in a way that enables the state to
remain competitive, possibly by eliminating or amending existing
regulations.19 For participating firms, the goal is to successfully navigate
the program and gain the experience and traction needed to legally
operate outside the sandbox once the testing period has ended.20

16. See Adam A. Millsap, Utah’s Effort to Expand Regulatory Sandboxes is Smart
Move, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2021, 9:32 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2021/02/01/utahs-effort-to-expand-regulatorysandboxes-is-smart-move/?sh=e81668b6a09c [https://perma.cc/V4BB-ALLG] (finding that
adjusting regulations is an alternative to taxation, spending, and monetary policy as
traditional government controls).
17. Mark Horton & Asmaa El-Ganainy, Fiscal Policy: Taking and Giving Away,
FIN. & DEV. – INT’L MONETARY FUND (Feb 24, 2020),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/fiscpol.htm [https://perma.cc/3YC399C8]; see Christian Gonzales et al., How State and Local Governments Win at Attracting
Companies, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/how-state-andlocal-governments-win-at-attracting-companies [https://perma.cc/7LDA-TKR6] (claiming
that state and local governments often use “fiscal incentives, including cash grants, rebates,
and tax credits, to entice them to relocate, expand, or stay in a specific locality”); see
Economics of Taxation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 5, 2010, 10:27 AM),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Taxes/Pages/economics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9C2F-WVF9] (finding that tax increases can discourage and penalize
industries that have harmful or negative externalities, and that excise taxes are used to
discourage alcohol and tobacco use, and are used during a war or national emergency to
reduce demand for scarce resources); see also Environmental Taxation: A Guide for Policy
Makers, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (Sept. 2011),
https://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/48164926.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC5J-7RF5]
(discussing how taxes can correct the market’s failure to adequately recognize the
environmental impacts of industry).
18. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-4(a) (“The purpose of the Innovation
Council is to support innovation, investment, and job creation within North Carolina by
encouraging participation in the regulatory sandbox.”).
19. See § 169-2(d) (“[T]he General Assembly finds that modernization of relevant
banking, insurance, and related laws will contribute to the economic vitality of all areas of
the State and will help North Carolina remain competitive in the twenty-first century.”).
20. See Hemphill, supra note 2 ("[B]y lowering the initial regulatory costs for new
market entrants, these firms have the opportunity to develop into competitors that can
absorb standard compliance costs, at which point they “graduate” from the sandbox.”).
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The United Kingdom (“UK”) implemented the first regulatory
sandbox in 2016 through the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).21
Before the UK sandbox program began, the FCA identified three
potential benefits of a regulatory sandbox: (1) it could the reduce time
and cost needed to bring products to market, (2) it might increase access
to finance, and (3) it might allow more innovative products to reach the
market.22 The UK’s sandbox also attempts to address the fact that
businesses are often unable to safely implement new products because of
uncertainties in the regulatory environment.23
The UK’s FCA used its regulatory sandbox to give fledgling
companies the opportunity to pursue innovative financial products
without requiring them to first build out large compliance programs,
which can be expensive to develop and require specific expertise.24
However, a firm’s time in the sandbox is limited: the UK’s sandbox
typically allows participation for a period of three to six months before
firms must implement a compliance function or stop operating.25 For
instance, participants from the UK’s most recent “cohort” of participants
include the companies Bayfikr and Blockpass.26 Bayfikr is an application
that enables immigrants living in the UK to pay bills in their home
country securely and without setting up foreign bank accounts.27
Blockpass is a software service which helps businesses comply with their
“know your customer” and anti-money laundering regulatory
requirements when they accept new customers.28
21. Id.
22. Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. at 5 (2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/52HJWRX2].
23. See Andrew Moyle & Fiona Maclean, World-First Regulatory Sandbox Open for
Play in the UK, LATHAM & WATKINS (May 9, 2016),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-world-first-regulatory-sandbox-open-for-playin-UK [https://perma.cc/FCB5-G6ZD] (claiming that “[u]ntil now, many businesses have
struggled to find a safe way to implement these technologies given the unknowns in the
regulatory environment and the risk of public scrutiny”).
24. See Hemphill, supra note 2 (recognizing that the UK sandbox is intended to allow
innovative businesses to test their products and overcome the high initial regulatory costs
that usually serve as a barrier to entry).
25. Default Standards for Sandbox Testing Parameters, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (2016),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/default-standards-for-sandbox-testingparameters.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXR7-XCSH].
26. Regulatory Sandbox – Cohort 7, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (2021),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox/regulatory-sandbox-cohort-7
[https://perma.cc/9WE3-RSGE].
27. Id.
28. Id.
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It did not take long for the sandbox idea to make its way across
the ocean.29 Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Florida, and West
Virginia, Texas, and North Carolina have each enacted legislation
creating regulatory sandboxes.30 As of this Note’s publication, regulatory
sandbox bills have been introduced in South Carolina and Louisiana.31
Proponents of regulatory sandboxes suggest they are necessary
for financial regulations to have a fighting chance at keeping pace with
rapid technological innovation.32 This is because the sandbox gives
regulators time to understand recent innovations before they attempt to
regulate them.33 Some advocates have said that regulators have a duty to
understand the benefits and risks of innovation, so that they can develop
regulations that can capitalize on the benefits while minimizing the risks
to consumers.34
A.

North Carolina’s Regulatory Sandbox Act

In 2019, lawmakers introduced a regulatory sandbox bill but it
failed to progress beyond the Committee on Banking in the N.C. House
of Representatives.35 Key stakeholders criticized the 2019 version
29. See Chrys D. Lemon et al., Two Industries Play in the Sand: Recent Fintech and
Insurtech Developments, 22 No. 5 FINTECH L. REP. NL 1 (2019),
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5d79f0e2fa4911e99b9e81ccebb1c823/View/FullTex
t.html?originationContext=docHeader&contextData=(sc.Search)&transitionType=Documen
t&needToInjectTerms=False&docSource=a406d26933c44a44bcf6110d5bf14a4c&firstPage
=true&bhcp=1 [https://perma.cc/X5RG-6CBV] (noting that Arizona was the first state to
create a fintech regulatory sandbox and had 7 participating companies by June, 2019).
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–5601(LexisNexis 2018); NV S.B. 161, 2019 80th
Leg., https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/SB/SB161_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BV3E-QQGS]; UTAH CODE ANN. §13 – 55 (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
40-29-101 (2019) (Wyoming); FLA. STAT. § 559.952 (2020) (Florida); W. VA. CODE § 31A8G-8 (2020); TEX. CODE ANN. § 2005.001 (2019); N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-1.
31. H. 4351, 2019 Gen. Assemb., 123rd Sess., (S.C. 2019); H.B. 482, 2021 Reg.
Sess., (La. 2021).
32. See Hemphill, supra note 2 (stating that Martec’s Law is a theory which claims
that innovation will always outpace regulation).
33. See Levin et al., supra note 8 (recognizing that “regulators can gather empirical
data about new business models and use an evidence-based approach for future policy
decisions”).
34. See Dan Quan, A Few Thoughts on Regulatory Sandboxes, STAN. CTR. ON
PHILANTHROPY AND CIV. SOC’Y, https://pacscenter.stanford.edu/a-few-thoughts-onregulatory-sandboxes/ [https://perma.cc/B3AX-US47] (arguing that “regulatory uncertainty
is the result of outdated regulations unable to catch up with innovation,” and that “agencies
need to actively seek to understand the benefits and risks of innovation, while developing
appropriate policies, guidance, and/or regulations to reap those benefits, protect consumers,
and safeguard the financial system”).
35. H.R. 1013, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.C. 2019).
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because it did not require companies to disclose to consumers that they
were sandbox participants, or that they did not have a license to offer
products outside the sandbox, the products could possibly expose
consumers to financial risk, and companies could participate in the
program indefinitely.36
A new bill, with significant changes from the 2019 version, was
introduced on April 20, 2021.37 The North Carolina Regulatory Sandbox
Act passed unanimously in the Senate on October 6, 2021, and received
unanimous approval in the House the next day.38 Governor Roy Cooper
signed the bill into law on October 15, 2021.39
B.

Specific Provisions of the North Carolina Regulatory Sandbox
Act

The N.C. Act creates an “Innovation Council” with a goal of
“support[ing] innovation, investment, and job creation within North
Carolina” by encouraging companies and individuals to participate in the
regulatory sandbox program.40 The N.C. Act also tasks the Council with
deciding which innovations the regulatory sandbox will support by
determining the policy priorities of the program.41 The Council plays the
gatekeeping role of deciding which entities to admit into the sandbox
program, based upon enumerated criteria.42 The Council must also assign
admitted participants to a state regulatory agency, which will in turn make
additional decisions concerning what regulations will be waived for a
sandbox participant.43
The eleven-member Council consists of a mixture of government
employee “designees” and policy experts who are called “public”
members.44 Designees are government employees chosen by the
36. Reiners, supra note 4.
37. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-4(a).
41. See id. (“The Council is empowered to set standards, principles, guidelines, and
policy priorities for the types of innovations that the regulatory sandbox program will
support.”).
42. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-6(a), § 169-6(d)(1-6) (empowering the
Innovation Council to “select and refer applicants to the applicable State agency” and
requiring the Innovation Council to consider a number of criteria when making the
determination of whether to admit applicants); see infra Part D.
43. Id. § 169-6(a).
44. Id. § 169-4(b).
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leadership of their respective agency to participate on the Innovation
Council.45 Public members are individuals who do not work in
government and are not designees appointed by government officials.46
North Carolina’s Commissioner of Banks and Commissioner of
Insurance each appoint a designee.47 The Secretary of State and Attorney
General also select designees.48 Two public members are appointed by
the Governor, and one public member is appointed by the Lieutenant
Governor.49 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate recommends two
public members from academia, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives recommends two public members from North Carolina’s
entrepreneurial or blockchain community.50
This results in a council composed of four government members
and seven public members.51 Based on the current political makeup of
the NC General Assembly, five of the seven public members will be
chosen by Republicans, and remaining two will be chosen by
Democrats.52 Members will serve staggered four-year terms.53 Members
can be reelected, but are limited to a total of two consecutive terms.54
C.

Requirements of Applicants

The Act currently allows firms implementing financial,
insurance, and blockchain technology to apply for participation in the
sandbox.55 Essentially, this encompasses all firms that would otherwise
be regulated by either the Office of the Commissioner of Banks or the
Department of Insurance.56 An additional requirement is that applicants
45. Id. § 169-4(b)(1-4).
46. See id. (requiring “public members” to have a “background in one or more of the
following areas: financial services; insurance; blockchain; Fintech; Insurtech; or
entrepreneurship”).
47. Id. § 169-4(b)(1-2).
48. Id. § 169-4(b)(3-4).
49. Id. § 169-4(b)(5-6).
50. Id. § 169-4(b)(7-8).
51. Id. § 169-4(b)(1-8).
52. North Carolina State Executive Offices, BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_state_executive_offices [https://perma.cc/WF8J2Q3U].
53. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-4(c).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Erin Jane Illman & Lindsay E. Medlin, Technology Boom in NC? What You
Should Know About the Proposed Regulatory Sandbox in the Tarheel State, BRADLEY:
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offer an “innovative product or service,” defined as a product that uses
emerging technology, or a product that does not currently have a
widespread offering in the state.57 For example, firms that qualify for
participation in the sandbox could be involved in peer-to-peer lending,
cryptocurrency, or money transmission.58 According to the North
Carolina statute, a money transmission occurs when an entity sells or
issues payment instruments primarily for household purposes, or when
an entity receives money for transmission by any means, including
electronic transfers and maintaining virtual currency on behalf of
others.59 For example, in Arizona, several innovative money transmitter
companies participated in the sandbox to test their products.60 These
participants included a cryptocurrency payments company that enables
payment to marijuana businesses, and a company that provides cash to
consumers in exchange for a share of their future earnings.61
All applicants must be corporations or other organized business
entities and must have a physical presence in North Carolina.62 Although
the N.C. Act does not explicitly prohibit or allow large, established firms
to enter the sandbox solely to test a particular product or service and
remain otherwise regulated, it can be inferred from the Act’s language
that the sandbox program is not intended to serve incumbent firms with
plenty of resources.63 It is clear that the Innovation Council can deny
applications at its discretion, which indicates that the drafters might have
intended the Council to make these decisions.64 The Council will
consider a number of different criteria when determining whether to
ONLINE & ON POINT (July 20, 2021),
https://www.onlineandonpoint.com/2021/07/technology-boom-in-nc-what-you-shouldknow-about-the-proposed-regulatory-sandbox-in-the-tarheel-state/ [https://perma.cc/P6HNLAKZ] (“The NC Sandbox Act would apply to entities regulated by the Office of
Commissioner of Banks or the Department of Insurance.”).
57. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-1(b)(6-7).
58. Miriam Cross, States Entice Fintechs by Giving Them Freedom to Experiment,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 26, 2020, 1:16 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/statesentice-Fintechs-by-giving-them-freedom-to-experiment [https://perma.cc/XU23-7EG8].
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.42(13)(a-b) (2016).
60. Sophie Quinton, Relaxed Rules Attract Entrepreneurs to State ‘Sandboxes’, PEW
CHARITABLE TR. (June 15, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2021/06/15/relaxed-rules-attract-entrepreneurs-to-state-sandboxes
[https://perma.cc/2RG5-3AQV].
61. Id.
62. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-6(c) (requiring applicants to be a
“corporation or other organized entity with a physical presence in North Carolina”).
63. See id. (finding that establishing the Innovation Council is intended to promote
“entrepreneurial development”).
64. Id. § 169-6(e).
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admit applicants.65 These criteria include the nature of the innovative
product or service, the methods that will be used to protect consumers,
the applicant’s business plan, and the availability of capital.66 The
council will also make its determination based on characteristics of the
firm’s management, including whether the management has the
necessary expertise, and whether anyone substantially involved with the
applicant has been convicted or investigated for fraud or securities
violations.67 In the name of transparency, the council must provide a
reason for denying an applicant, but the N.C. Act otherwise gives the
council considerable leeway in determining which applicants to admit.68
Once the council admits an applicant, the council will direct it to
a state agency—either the Commissioner of Banks or Commissioner of
Insurance—that determines which regulations the applicant may be
exempted from.69 These regulations must currently prevent the entity
from offering its innovative product or service in North Carolina.70 The
applicant can participate in the program for twenty-four months, with the
possibility of an extension if approved by the applicable state agency.71
The agency can make several other determinations.72 It may prescribe,
on a case-by-case basis, the maximum number of consumers to whom an
applicant may offer its product or service to, and the maximum amount
of money that consumers can invest, in an effort to permit
experimentation while limiting the exposure of consumers.73 The state
agency may also require the entity to post a consumer protection bond to
provide as security in the event that consumers suffer losses.74
At the end of the firm’s participation in the sandbox program it
must submit a final report,75 the specifics of which will be determined by
65. Id. § 169-6(d).
66. Id.
67. See id. § 169-6(c) (requiring all individuals who are significantly involved in the
firm to submit to a criminal background check).
68. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-6(d-e).
69. See id. § 169-3(b) (“[A] waiver . . . shall be no broader than necessary to
accomplish the purposes set forth in this Act, as determined by the applicable State
agency.”).
70. Id. § 169-3(a) (“[A] person who makes an innovative product or service available
to consumers in the regulatory sandbox may be granted a waiver of specified requirements .
. . if these statutes or rules do not currently permit the product or service to be made
available to consumers.”).
71. Id. § 169-7(a).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-7(b).
75. Id. § 169-7(c).
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the applicable State agency.76 The firm must also keep certain business
records for five years after the conclusion of the testing period.77 These
records must include documents and data produced by the business and
be made available to the state agency upon request.78
The N.C. Act envisions nonprofits playing an important role in
the sandbox process.79
It provides for a designated nonprofit
organization, authorized by the Secretary of State, to help sandbox
participants with the application process.80 These organizations may help
entities develop their product or service during their participation in the
program.81 They may also make recommendations to participants
regarding the design and application of innovative technologies.82
Nonprofits that want to assist in this capacity must submit an application
to the Innovation Council for approval.83 It is unclear from the N.C. Act’s
language whether the nonprofit must have no previous connection with
sandbox participants, or whether a participant could establish a nonprofit
for the purpose of advising firms participating in the sandbox.84
The Act specifically lists a number of consumer protection
statutes from which a participant’s operations may not be exempted.85
For example, participants must abide by Chapter 24 of North Carolina’s
General Statutes, which sets maximum interest rates and origination
fees.86 Participants also remain subject to the Consumer Finance Act,
which in part prohibits the advertising of false or misleading statements
about the rates or conditions of loans.87
76. See id. (“[T]he sandbox participant shall submit a final report in a manner and
format prescribed by the applicable State agency.”).
77. Id. § 169-9.
78. Id.
79. See id. § 169-2(d) (“The General Assembly finds that certain nonprofit
organizations are to be recognized as having a significant contribution for guiding
companies through the regulatory sandbox process and providing technical assistance”).
80. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-5.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (stating only that a “designated nonprofit” that has been “authorized by
the Office of the Secretary of State” and whose application has been approved by the
Innovation Council shall assist in implementing the program).
85. Id. § 169-8(a)(1-8).
86. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-8(a)(1); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §24-1.1
(2020) (setting the maximum interest rate at 16% for principal amounts of $25,000 or less
and limiting origination fees to $100 for principal amounts of $1499.99 or less).
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-183 (2020) (“No licensee subject to this Article shall
advertise, display, distribute, telecast, or broadcast or cause or permit to be advertised,
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Participants must disclose to consumers that the innovative
product or service is only temporarily authorized by the state, and that by
this authorization, the state does not endorse or recommend the product
and is not liable for losses suffered by consumers as a result of using the
product or service.88 The entity must also tell consumers how to file
complaints or other comments to the applicable state agency.89
In sum, the North Carolina Sandbox Act contains a number of
provisions that are aimed at helping participants test out innovative
products90 while still protecting consumers.91 The following section
illustrates how this Act will improve the regulatory system in North
Carolina.
III. WHY A SANDBOX WILL BENEFIT NORTH CAROLINA
Businesses and consumers alike will benefit from a regulatory
sandbox because it will encourage innovation by reducing barriers to
entry for small firms, increase North Carolina’s competitiveness with
other states, encourage investment, and spur competition.92
A.

Reducing Barriers to Entry

One of the largest barriers to market entry by Fintech firms is the
regulatory burden and the costs associated with setting up a compliance
program.93 A study on the effects of regulations on market entry found
that lower entry costs were associated with a higher rate of market entry,
while higher costs were predictive of fewer market entrants.94
displayed, distributed, telecasted, or broadcasted, in any manner whatsoever, any false,
misleading, or deceptive statement or representation.”).
88. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-8(b)(1-4).
89. Id. § 169-8(b)(4).
90. See id. § 169-3(a) (allowing participants to waive certain rules and requirements).
91. See id. § 169-8(a) (prohibiting the waiver of specified consumer protection
statutes).
92. Illman & Medlin, supra note 56.
93. See O’Sullivan, supra note 7 at 2 (“Because new companies lack the capital and
lawyers to navigate established regulatory structures, they are often preemptively shut out of
the market.”).
94. See Leora Klapper et al., Entry Regulation as a Barrier to Entrepreneurship, 82
J. OF FIN. ECON. 591, 591 (2006) https://www-sciencedirectcom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/science/article/pii/S0304405X06000936?via%3Dihub
[https://perma.cc/BE7E-PUBR] (explaining the low rate of incorporation in Italy by the high
regulatory cost associated with incorporation, which is twice as high in Italy as other
European countries).
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Regulations constrain businesses by imposing licensure,
auditing, and reporting requirements.95 This requires new firms to
develop a compliance program, which can be expensive and significantly
increase start-up costs.96 In many cases, the cost of meeting these
regulatory requirements is significant enough to dissuade innovators.97
Regulations are often not designed for “fail fast” ideas.98 “Fail fast” is a
theory which prioritizes adaptation and flexibility over adherence to a
specific idea.99 The theory holds that expending resources in pursuit of a
single innovation can be inefficient—it is better to cut one’s losses and
move on if the idea seems likely to fail.100
The legislative findings of the N.C. Act recognize that current
laws can be outdated because they were not written to reflect current
technologies.101 For instance, the Consumer Finance Act was passed in
1961, and N.C. General Statute Chapter 24 - 1.1 was passed in 1969,
although they both have been amended.102
The existing state regulations restrict innovation because they
were largely created at a time when technology did not play as large a
role in the financial industry as it now does.103 Regulatory sandboxes
encourage innovation by lowering these barriers to entry for smaller

95. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 2.
96. See Lemon et al., supra note 29 (“The high upfront compliance and regulatory
costs facing FinTech and InsurTech startups, coupled with this uncertain consumer demand,
often deter businesses from testing innovative products and services in the marketplace.”).
97. Id.
98. Erin Jane Illman & Lindsay E. Medlin, A Fintech Leader's Thoughts on the North
Carolina Regulatory Sandbox Act, BRADLEY: ONLINE & ON POINT (Aug. 4, 2021),
https://www.onlineandonpoint.com/2021/08/a-fintech-leaders-thoughts-on-the-northcarolina-regulatory-sandbox-act/ [https://perma.cc/PD8W-9S6G].
99. Rick Goldberg & Jim Ruehlin, Fail Fast and Learn Fast, IBM: GARAGE
METHODOLOGY, https://www.ibm.com/garage/method/practices/culture/failing-fast/
[https://perma.cc/ZRA9-FGXJ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2022).
100. See Rajat Khanna et al., Fail Often, Fail Big, and Fail Fast? Learning From Small
Failures and R&D Performance in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 ACAD. OF MGMT.
SCI. 436, 459 (2016) (finding that the voluntary expiration of patents by pharmaceutical
firms results in fewer patents, but an increase in the overall quality of patents).
101. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-2(a) (“[E]xisting legal and regulatory
frameworks are restricting innovation because these frameworks were established largely at
a time when technology was not a fundamental component of industry ecosystems,
including banking and insurance.”).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-183 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1969).
103. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-2(a) (“[T]he General Assembly finds
that existing legal and regulatory frameworks are restricting innovation because these
frameworks were established largely at a time when technology was not a fundamental
component of industry ecosystems, including banking and insurance.”).
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firms.104 The goal of sandboxes is to empower firms to test a new product
in order to gauge how much value consumers place on it,105 and to enable
firms to become established enough to be able to bear the costs associated
with regulatory compliance.106
B.

Helping North Carolina Compete with Other States

Lower barriers to entry will, in turn, help North Carolina’s
economy remain competitive on a national scale.107 Allowing innovation
to occur unfettered is extremely important to remaining competitive—
both at the state level and globally.108 The General Assembly recognized
that the banking and insurance industries are both currently major drivers
of economic activity for the state, and the emerging fields of Fintech and
Insurtech are essential for sustaining future growth.109
The Act also acknowledges that these industries are currently
undergoing a “transformational period.”110 Because innovators need
some regulatory flexibility to bring new products or services to market,
the drafters of the N.C. Act recommend adopting a “taxonomy” related
to emerging technologies into state law.111 Businesses seeking a location
for expansion or to deploy a new innovative product or service will likely
be attracted to a state with a regulatory framework friendly towards
innovation.112
The N.C. Act also provides North Carolina regulators with the
ability to enter into “recognition agreements” with regulators in other
states or countries.113 Regulators in other states can give permission for

104. Hemphill, supra note 2.
105. See Millsap, supra note 16 (recognizing that sandboxes “give entrepreneurs a
chance to see if their products work and are valued by customers even when those products
do not fit within the current regulatory framework”).
106. Hemphill, supra note 2.
107. See David N. Bass, Regulatory Sandbox Bill One Step Closer to Becoming Law
After Clearing N.C. House, CAROLINA J. (June 17, 2021),
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/regulatory-sandbox-bill-one-step-closer-tobecoming-law-after-clearing-n-c-house/ [https://perma.cc/9CHW-Q5CQ] (recognizing that
“[b]eing able to innovate at a greater pace than everyone else will be the great measuring
stick over the next century, and the tough truth is there will have to be winners and losers”).
108. Id.
109. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Cross, supra note 58.
113. Lemon et al., supra note 29.
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sandbox participants to operate in their jurisdiction.114 Likewise, the N.C.
Act permits entities that are authorized to operate as sandbox participants
in other states to operate in North Carolina.115 This parity of recognition
can help firms expand without having to comply with duplicitous or
inconsistent regulations, and will enable North Carolina to keep pace with
other states that have sandboxes.116
C.

Encouraging Investment

Another benefit of the regulatory sandbox is that it encourages
investment.117 By gaining entry into a sandbox program, startups might
be able to secure financing from investors who would otherwise be
hesitant.118 Even though participating firms must disclose that their
participation in the program is not equivalent to a government
endorsement, the fact that they cleared the initial hurdle of acceptance
into the program could reassure potential investors and alleviate
concerns.119
D.

Spurring Competition

One of the main obstacles faced by innovative new firms is the
perception that they are disruptive and are an existential threat to
incumbent firms, rather than beneficial to everyone.120 Regulatory
sandboxes can help firms overcome this perception problem by
demonstrating to consumers and incumbents alike that they can benefit
everyone involved.121
Regulatory sandboxes can be beneficial by spurring competition
in the finance and insurance industries.122 A study on the effectiveness
of UK’s regulatory sandbox found that incumbent firms responded to
114. Id.
115. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-12(c).
116. Lemon et al., supra note 29.
117. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598, The Impact and Effectiveness of
Innovate 1, 18 (Apr. 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/the-impact-andeffectiveness-of-innovate.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DP4-M7JC] (finding that 17 of the 44
participants in cohorts 1-3 were either acquired by incumbents, or received investment
during or after their test).
118. Lemon et al., supra note 29.
119. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-8(b)(3); Lemon et al., supra note 29.
120. Illman & Medlin, supra note 98.
121. Id.
122. Cross, supra note 58.
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“disruptive innovation” from sandbox participants by increasing their
own efforts at pursuing innovation.123 In some cases, incumbent firms
incorporated these innovations into their own novel products and
services.124
Lowering regulatory barriers enables smaller firms to enter the
marketplace and offer products that can disrupt outdated business models
and products that have dominated in the past.125 In many cases,
sandboxes can encourage partnerships between established firms and
those participating in the program.126 Even when incumbents do not
partner with newcomers, they often decide to pursue their own versions
of these products or services in order to compete.127 This motivates large,
established companies to invest in innovations themselves, and also
enables them to learn from the participation of smaller firms.128
While regulations provide important protections for consumers
against unscrupulous or incompetent firms, increased competition
benefits consumers by giving them more choices.129 Competition also
benefits consumers by putting pressure on incumbent firms who may
otherwise have no reason to innovate.130 Advocates of regulatory
sandboxes view them as a way to balance these competing goals and
expand consumer choices without sacrificing protections.131

123. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598 (finding that incumbent firms
expanded “their focus at an organisation level by expanding their innovation capabilities and
strategies”).
124. See id. (finding that incumbent firms responded to “specific instances of
disruption by launching similar new products and services, sometimes in response to firms
that have received Innovate support”).
125. Illman & Medline., supra note 56.
126. See Erin Jane Illman & Lindsay Medlin , What the Proposed North Carolina
Regulatory Sandbox Could Mean for Fintech and the Financial Services Community, JD
SUPRA (July 29, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-the-proposed-northcarolina-1558682/ [https://perma.cc/MH26-R3DK] (noting that sandboxes have the
“potential to foster early partnerships between the existing North Carolina financial firms
and the fintech companies participating in the sandbox program”).
127. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 2.
128. Cross, supra note 58.
129. Jon Sanders, Regulatory Sandboxes: Test Runs with Lighter Regulation for
Innovative Products, JOHN LOCKE FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2021)
https://www.johnlocke.org/update/regulatory-sandboxes-test-runs-with-lighter-regulationfor-innovative-products/ [https://perma.cc/2KQK-VL2Y].
130. O’Sullivan, supra note 7.
131. Sanders, supra note 129.

2022]
E.

N.C. SANDBOX ACT

317

Increasing Positive Outcomes of Participation

Another benefit of regulatory sandbox programs is that firms that
participate are much better off than those that were not accepted into the
sandbox program, whether or not they successfully graduate from the
program.132 Firms that do successfully exit from the sandbox are better
off because they are able to delay compliance costs until they have proof
that their product is viable and can attract consumers.133 Unsuccessful
firms are also better off because they will lose less money overall by
avoiding initial regulatory compliance costs.134
A 2019 study conducted in the United Kingdom tracked the
performance of sandbox participants against innovative firms who chose
not to participate.135 The study found that participants got their product
or service to market 40% faster than nonparticipants.136 Additionally,
80% of participants “graduated” and continued to operate longer than
nonparticipants, and half of the participants secured partnerships with
incumbent firms.137
F.

Benefits to Lower-Income Consumers

An unexpected benefit of sandboxes is that lower-income
consumers may benefit from their products and services.138 Innovative
products and services are often targeted towards consumers from these
market segments.139 For example, Verdigris Holdings participated in
Arizona’s regulatory sandbox and was able to test out its digital banking
service which is intended to serve underbanked communities.140 Grain,
another Fintech company that participated in Arizona’s regulatory
sandbox, avoided capital barriers and introduced a revolving credit line
service based on the credit and debit activity associated with a
132. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598 (finding that 76% of the firms
who were accepted into the first cohort are still active in the UK two years later, compared
to 57% of the firms who applied but were not accepted).
133. O’Sullivan, supra note 7.
134. See id. (“[F]irms whose business models are found to be unworkable or
unprofitable may fold without losing as much investment as they otherwise would if they
had to comply with the full regulatory burdens from the start.”).
135. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598 at 16.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 23.
139. Id.
140. Cross, supra note 58.
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consumer’s bank account.141 This service allows underserved consumers
who may not otherwise qualify for a credit card to use their debit card
like a credit card and bridge the gap between paychecks for unexpected
emergency costs.142 Without the sandbox, these companies and the
benefits they bring would be lost.
IV. CRITICISMS
A.

Weakening of Consumer Protections

Relaxing regulations could be bad for both established businesses
and consumers.143 It could harm consumers, because some regulations
are clearly in place to protect individuals.144 Even though the N.C. Act
proposes leaving existing consumer protection laws in place, allowing
firms to waive other regulations opens consumers up to more risk.145
Relaxing regulations could be bad for established businesses as well.146
“Reasonable but fair” regulations are in place to protect businesses from
themselves.147 In other words, without certain regulations, businesses
might pursue products or services that expose customers to risk and
themselves to liability and negative publicity.
For example, sandbox participants could waive a North Carolina
law that requires the licensing of mortgage lenders and accompanying
oversight and enforcement provisions.148 Without these protections,
mortgage lenders could be more likely to engage in unfair, deceptive, and
fraudulent practices that harm consumers, such as charging excessive
interest rates.149
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Andrew G. Simpson, 15 Emerging Risks from Policies to Playgrounds,
Sandboxes to Scooters, INS. J. (Oct. 18, 2018) https://www-proquestcom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/2121560397/fulltext/C9D3D164577F4174PQ/1?accounti
d=14244 [https://perma.cc/TDM9-STTP].
144. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT § 53-166 (2021) (subjecting lenders to licensure
requirement and penalties for failure to comply with or attempting to evade application of
the statute); see also N.C. GEN STAT § 53-169 (2021) (requiring licensure for individuals or
firms who want to loan money).
145. Simpson, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-244.020 (2009) (protecting “consumers seeking
mortgage loans and to ensure that the mortgage lending industry operates without unfair,
deceptive, and fraudulent practices on the part of mortgage loan originators”).
149. Id.
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Another law clearly intended to protect consumers applies to
check-cashing businesses and imposes various requirements, such as
licensure rules, minimum asset thresholds, and limitations on fees
charged.150 If check-cashing businesses that participate in the Sandbox
were allowed to charge unlimited fees, they could prey on vulnerable
consumers who lack access to traditional banking services.
B.

Regulators Legitimizing Dangerous and Unproven Technology

An additional criticism leveled at regulatory sandboxes is that
they result in regulators playing the improper role of authorizing untested
technology and providing valuable publicity to participants.151 Critics
point out that financial regulators’ foremost mandate generally is to
protect consumers, not give startups free marketing or a perceived “stamp
of approval.”152 Firms might participate in the sandbox for its public
relations value, rather than out of a legitimate need for relief from
regulations.153 Indeed, most firms see their sandbox experience as a
“badge of honor” and view their acceptance as a boost to credibility with
customers and investors alike.154 Those who adhere to this viewpoint
believe that the list of firms participating in sandboxes should be kept
confidential, instead of being published for all to see.155 They claim that
keeping the list confidential would reduce the use of sandbox designation
by participants as a cheap source of positive public relations.156
Related to this line of criticism is the recognition that not all
innovations are good and sandboxes could do real harm by giving
legitimacy to risky, unproven financial technologies.157 Some recent
examples of such harmful innovations include so-called “NINJA”
mortgages, “CDO squared” derivatives, and Payment Protection
150. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-275(2) (1997); see also N.C. Gen Stat § 53-280
(1997) (imposing maximum fees on check-cashing businesses).
151. Jemima Kelly, A “Fintech Sandbox” Might Sound Like a Harmless Idea. It’s
Not., FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3d551ae2-9691-3dd8-901fc22c22667e3b [https://perma.cc/2GSD-UVPV].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. David Strachan & Suchitra Nair, A Journey Through the FCA Regulatory
Sandbox, DELOITTE: PERSPECTIVES at 3 (2018)
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/financial-services/articles/journey-throughfinancial-conduct-authority-regulatory-sandbox.html [https://perma.cc/M32V-HC6H].
155. Kelly, supra note 151.
156. Id.
157. Id.

320

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 26

Insurance.158 NINJA (no income, job, or assets) mortgages are loans
which do not require verification of an applicant’s income, assets, or
job.159 They were part of the aggressive lending practices that became
popular in the years leading up to the 2008 Financial Crisis, and are
believed to have contributed to the downfall of the U.S. housing
market.160
A “CDO squared” is a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”)
that is composed of securities from other CDOs.161 Whereas a regular
CDO is backed by mortgages themselves, a CDO squared is comprised
of various tranches of mortgage backed securities contained in CDOs.162
CDO-squared investments have been criticized for their complexity,
which makes the risk of loss difficult to judge.163 Losses in CDO-squared
derivatives are hard to estimate because it is difficult to predict the
location of defaults within the different CDO tranches of which they are
comprised.164 Therefore, for a given rate of default of the underlying
CDOs, the rate of loss for a CDO-squared derivative could vary
considerably depending on the location of the defaults within the CDO
tranche structure.165 Another reason that CDO-squared derivatives can
be deceptively risky is that they can bear credit ratings which are much
higher than the underlying securities they are comprised of.166 For
instance, a CDO-squared derivative composed of CDOs with A and BBB
credit ratings can result in a security with investment-grade credit.167
Research suggests that CDO-squared derivatives contributed to the
severity of the 2008 financial crisis because in a time of financial stress,
158. Id.
159. Sara Routhier, What is a NINJA Loan?, LOANS.ORG (Aug. 3, 2021)
https://www.loans.org/mortgage/what-is-a-ninja-loan/ [https://perma.cc/ETJ7-2DKR].
160. Id.
161. Andrew Adams, et al., The Risks in CDO-Squared Structures, 13
MULTINATIONAL FIN. J. 55, 56 (2009)
https://www.mfsociety.org/modules/modDashboard/uploadFiles/journals/MJ~768~p16uegc
dip1bc011qebroctpem64.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PHY-7ZS4].
162. Id. at 56.
163. Id.
164. Rajiv Bhatt et al., Hidden Risks in the CDO – Squared Market, CTR. FOR FIN.
MKT. RSCH. 1, 17 (2005)
https://era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/1825/CFMR_053.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/28KA-CVL5].
165. Id. at 17-18.
166. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, Final Report of National Commission on the
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 127, 132
(2011), https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_chapter8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGW8-KEEH].
167. Id.
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the derivative can result in higher-than-expected losses depending on the
location of the defaults and the quality of the underlying securities.168
Payment Protection Insurance (“PPI”) was another financial
innovation that led to the exploitation of consumers.169 When borrowers
received loans from banks, they also purchased PPI as a hedge against
inability to repay the loan because of illness or job loss.170 PPI was very
profitable for banks, and it could increase the overall cost of loans by as
much as fifty percent.171 However, the contracts contained numerous
“exclusions clauses” which restricted the ability of purchasers to make
claims. This rendered as many as a third of the insurance contracts
worthless.172 Since 2011, banks in the UK have had to pay out forty-five
billion dollars as compensation to consumers for inappropriately selling
this insurance product.173 Because all of these financial “innovations”
resulted in harm to both consumers and the economy, opponents of the
regulatory sandbox idea urge caution in blind support of innovation for
its own sake.174
Skeptics also claim that sandboxes do not actually help regulators
understand new technologies because of the small scale of sandbox
innovation experiments.175 These critics assert that by restricting the
amount of money at stake and the number of consumers that firms can
interact with, sandboxes preclude regulators from understanding the full
extent of an innovation’s impact on the stability of the broader financial
system.176
V. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
This section will survey some missed opportunities that were left
on the table with the N.C. Act. The Innovation Council can strengthen
the sandbox by drawing on lessons learned in other jurisdictions that have

168. Adams et al., supra note 161.
169. Frances Coppola, The UK’s Biggest Financial Scandal Bites its Biggest Bank –
Again, FORBES (July 31, 2019, 3:20 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2019/07/31/the-u-k-s-biggest-financialscandal-bites-its-biggest-bank-again/?sh=2d281af57e20 [https://perma.cc/5HDP-VPJ7].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Kelly, supra note 151.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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effectively rolled out similar programs and incorporating these lessons
into the sandbox program.177
Although the N.C. Administrative Procedures Act prohibits
agencies from adopting rules that implement or interpret a law unless the
law specifically authorizes the agency to do so,178 such authority might
be found in the N.C. Act itself.179 The statutory language may therefore
provide the Innovation Council with enough discretionary authority to
interpret the N.C. Act with regard to the application process and for
setting “standards, principles, guidelines, and policy priorities” for the
type of innovations that the N.C. Act will support.180
A.

Adopt a Collaborative “Checks and Balances” Approach for the
Admissions Process

To begin, the N.C. Act could benefit from adopting a “checks and
balances” approach to the admission of participants, rather than relying
upon the Innovation Council to make a unilateral decision regarding
which firms to admit to the sandbox.181 Under the “checks and balances”
approach, regulators have some input in the admissions process.182 For
instance, in some jurisdictions the entity responsible for administering the
sandbox must get approval from the applicable regulatory agency before
it can admit an applicant.183 In seeking this approval, the authority may
consult with the applicable agencies and may request information relating
to the applicant.184
177. Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 642 (2019),
https://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/87-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.-579.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MX3D-3EUW].
178. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-19 (2011) (“An agency may not adopt a rule that
does one or more of the following…[i]mplements or interprets a law unless that law or
another law specifically authorizes the agency to do so.”).
179. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-4(a) (recognizing that the Innovation
Council “is empowered to set standards, principles, guidelines, and policy priorities for the
types of innovations that the regulatory sandbox program will support” and the Innovation
Council is “responsible for admission into the regulatory sandbox program and for assigning
selected participants to the applicable State agency”).
180. Id.
181. See Allen, supra note 177, at 622 (advocating that “decisions to grant regulatory
sandbox relief should be made by a committee of regulators, which would set the terms of
the sandbox relief, including the parameters for testing”).
182. UTAH CODE ANN. §13-55-103(9)(a) (2020).
183. Id.
184. See UTAH CODE ANN. §13-55-103(9)(b)(i-iv) (2020) (stating that the sandbox
authority can request information from applicable agencies such as: whether the agency has
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In the N.C. Act, the Innovation Council has the sole authority to
decide which firms are admitted, and the Council performs this function
with complete independence.185 A preferable alternative to this approach
is to allow the state regulatory agencies to have some input in this
decision, but not necessarily to require their approval before the Council
can admit an applicant.186 For example, the Innovation Council could
allow the applicable regulator, either the Commissioner of Banks or the
Department of Insurance, to review applications first and provide its
opinion through a preliminary report. The Innovation Council could then
engage in its own analysis of the applicant, utilizing the agency’s report,
and ultimately render the final decision.
There are several distinct benefits of this approach: it will better
inform regulators, encourage cooperation and collaboration among
regulatory agencies, and mitigate the Act’s misplaced reliance on
nonprofits.187
1. Regulators Will be Better-Informed
This collaborative admissions process can balance the regulatory
agency’s expertise with the Innovation Council’s own analysis, which is
guided by the overarching goal of promoting innovation.188 This
approach is preferable because it requires the Innovation Council to rely
on the specialized knowledge of the regulatory agencies but leaves the
ultimate decision to the Council, which may be better-suited to make an
independent decision.189 Since the regulatory agencies will be burdened
with the bulk of oversight responsibility, they may have a vested interest
in excluding firms who will be difficult or problematic to regulate, even
previously issued a license to the applicant, whether the agency has previously investigated
or sanctioned the applicant, and whether certain regulations should not be waived
notwithstanding the applicant’s admission to the sandbox).
185 N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-6(a).
186. See Allen, supra note 177 at 600 (quoting Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411,
427 (2011)) (advocating for a collaborative regulatory process which recognizes “ongoing
deliberation as the most legitimate and most effective mechanism for making decisions in
complex organizational structures”).
187. See Reiners, supra note 4 (recognizing that the N.C. Act’s reliance on
nonprofits is confusing and will detract from the benefits of sandbox participation).
188. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-4(a) (proposing that the purpose of the
Council is to “support innovation, investment, and job creation within North Carolina”).
189. See Allen, supra note 177 at 620 (concluding that “ideally, the regulator
operating the regulatory sandbox would have a perspective and expertise that spans the full
range of financial products and services available”).
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if the benefits of the innovation outweigh the hassle.190 Therefore, the
Innovation Council may be a more unbiased and representative group
than the regulatory agencies themselves.191
2. Encourage Collaboration Between Regulators
This revised approach will also likely facilitate greater
communication between regulators.192 Because institutional change is
often slow and deliberate, regulators can have a hard time keeping pace
with innovation.193 The dialogue and collaboration driven by regulatory
sandboxes can help regulators and innovators learn from one another.194
Innovators can learn more about which regulations they will eventually
encounter, and regulators have the opportunity to examine regulations
from the perspective of companies who offer novel products that may not
easily fit within the existing regulatory framework.195
Adopting a collaborative approach to the sandbox application
process may also encourage North Carolina regulators from different
agencies to collaborate.196 This collaboration would most likely take
place between Department of Insurance, the Commissioner of Banks, and
the Innovation Council itself—although other agencies could be included
in the discussion as needed.197 Regulators can identify common
challenges faced by the entities they regulate and brainstorm ways to ease
these burdens on new firms.198
Regulators would also have the chance to learn about emerging
Fintech and Insurtech trends and could leverage this knowledge to

190. See id. at 619-620 (arguing against state-run regulatory sandboxes because state
regulators lack incentives to promote financial stability, but also recognizing that federal
regulators in the past have used their preemption powers to the detriment of consumers).
191. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 3.
192. Hemphill, supra note 2.
193. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 3.
194. See Levin et al., supra note 8 (“The opportunities for regulators to collaborate
and share evidence about a broad range of FinTech solutions will help support informed
policies, tests, and avoid problems that could arise if the sample size of applicants in one
jurisdiction is too small or concentrated.”).
195. Cross, supra note 58.
196. Lemon et al., supra note 29.
197. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-1(b)(1) (defining the “applicable state
agency” as either the Commissioner of Banks or the Department of Insurance, depending on
the agency’s regulatory oversight and whether they are responsible for the product or
service in question).
198. Lemon et al., supra note 29.
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improve the regulatory system overall.199 Through this self-reflective
process, regulators could update regulations in the name of efficiency,
and could even eliminate regulations that are burdensome and do not
protect consumers or the economy.200
3. Mitigate North Carolina’s Reliance on Nonprofits
Another important benefit of imbuing the admissions process
with a collaborative component is that it could help resolve the issues
created by the N.C. Act’s overt reliance on nonprofits.201 The N.C. Act
provides that nonprofits will play an important but undefined role in the
sandbox; it stipulates that authorized nonprofit organizations shall
provide consulting services to sandbox applicants and participants
alike.202 The Innovation Council will recognize certain nonprofits to
assist firms in navigating the application process and help firms with the
design and implementation of their products and services during their
participation in the sandbox program itself.203 These organizations will
specifically be empowered to help firms by providing input and
recommendations with regard to the application of innovative
technologies.204 There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the role
of nonprofits in the N.C. Act.205 It is unclear whether the nonprofits
would be created for this particular purpose, or whether existing
nonprofits can step into this role.206 While the nonprofit’s role is illdefined by the N.C. Act, it appears that nonprofits are included to reduce
the burden on the innovation council or the applicable state agencies of
guiding applicants through the process.207

199. See Illman & Medlin, supra note 126.
200. Hemphill, supra note 2; Millsap, supra note 16.
201. See Reiners, supra note 4 (arguing that “[t]he language around consulting with
nongovernmental organizations should be deleted. In order to codify one of the main
benefits of a sandbox, legislators may want to consider adding language that references
information sharing between sandbox participants and the Innovation Commission.”).
202. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-5.
203. See id. (stipulating that nonprofits will be “recognized as partners that may help
sandbox applicants navigate the regulatory sandbox application process”).
204. Id.
205. See id. (explaining that the N.C. Act proposes only that a nonprofit will be
recognized by the Office of the Secretary of State to assist participants, while only
mentioning in passing that other nonprofits “may” assist participants, and otherwise leaves
the extent of the nonprofit role undefined).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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North Carolina’s Sandbox Act would be more effective if the
Innovation Council, rather than nonprofits, played a consulting role.208
Communication between regulators and applicants will benefit both
parties, and the N.C. Act’s current reliance on nonprofits will likely
detract from the interaction between regulators and firms.209 The N.C.
Act will forego some of the most valuable collaborative benefits to come
out of the sandbox concept by outsourcing some of this communication
to nonprofits.210 Participating firms will be denied the important
advantage of interacting personally with the regulators who will
hopefully be overseeing them directly in the future.211 Participants will
also be at a disadvantage because nonprofits are not as qualified as
regulators themselves to provide useful advice and guidance.212 There is
certain information that only regulators will be able to provide, such as
agency interpretations of ambiguous rules and emerging trends in the
field.213
B.

Give Extra Consideration to Competitors of Admitted Applicants

Another feature of the application process utilized by other
jurisdictions that North Carolina could benefit from is the requirement
that competitors of admitted participants be given special consideration
for inclusion in the sandbox.214 In other jurisdictions which have
implemented a sandbox, the equivalent of the Innovation Council is
required to determine whether the competitor of an applicant has been
admitted.215 If so, then this must weigh in favor of the Council’s decision
to admit the applicant.216 The purpose of this extra consideration is to
avoid the fundamental competitive unfairness that would result from
selectively excluding competing firms from the important benefits
available through the sandbox program.217
208. Reiners, supra note 4.
209. Id.
210. See id. (claiming that endorsing the use of nonprofits is problematic because “it
denies one of the essential sandbox benefits to both fintech firms and regulators”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See UTAH CODE ANN. §13-55-103 (2020) (mandating the sandbox administrator
determine whether an applicant’s competitor has already been admitted; if it has, then the
Department must weigh this in favor of admitting the applicant).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 6.
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Including the competitors of admitted sandbox participants could
also remedy the negative optics of the sandbox being viewed by investors
or consumers as a state endorsement of the participating firm.218 Even
though the N.C. Act requires participants to disclose to consumers that
being admitted to the sandbox is not an endorsement by the state, it is still
conceivable that some investors will be misled by the mere fact that the
firm has been admitted to participate in the program.219 A UK study
which found that sandbox participants attracted investors more easily
than nonparticipants suggests that this could be an issue.220
C.

Require a Proof of Concept

Yet another aspect of the N.C. Act’s application process that
could be improved by borrowing from other jurisdictions is the
requirement that firms make extensive disclosures and justify their
participation in the program as a prerequisite to their admission.221 In its
current iteration, the N.C. Act allows the Innovation Council to consider
several criteria when deciding which applicants to admit.222 Among these
criteria are the firm’s business plan and the nature of the innovative
product or service, including the potential risk to consumers.223
In jurisdictions that have implemented regulatory sandboxes
successfully, applicants have been required to provide more detailed
disclosures than those required by the N.C. Act.224 For instance, in Utah,
Florida, Kentucky, and Nevada, firms are sometimes required to explain

218. Id.
219. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-8(b)(3).
220. See O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 3 (finding that “sandbox participants may have
an easier time attracting finance than non-participants. This could be because investors
(rightly or wrongly) view sandbox participation as a kind of government endorsement of
this business model, or at the very least a sign that these firms will have fewer regulatory
issues than non-participants.”).
221. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox Application (2021),
https://www.onlinesurveys.fca.org.uk/jfe/form/SV_3aBdqb3jfKmuRSK
[https://perma.cc/TD7S-WGJJ].
222. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act §169-6(d)(1-6).
223. Id.
224. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598 (recognizing that because the UK
Sandbox has been in operation since 2015, it has benefited from a relatively long period of
experimentation and has matured as a result. This is evidenced by statistics which reflect
the effectiveness of the program: In 2019, out of about 1,500 applications, 686 firms
received support from the sandbox program).
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why they need to test their innovation in the sandbox.225 In other
jurisdictions, applicants must also show how the product or service is a
genuine innovation, how it will benefit consumers, and that it is ready for
testing.226 Applicants must also prove to the sandbox authority that they
have a testing plan which has clear objectives and criteria for success, and
that they have already completed some testing.227 A failure to show the
above could result in the rejection of a sandbox applicant.228 By
incorporating some of these specific criteria, the N.C. sandbox can avoid
expending resources on firms that do not truly need to participate in the
sandbox, and avoid firms who need to do more groundwork before they
are ready.229
D.

Provide a Declaratory Statement

Another area in which the N.C. Act could be improved is by
borrowing from other jurisdictions the practice of disclosing to
participants which statutes may be eligible for waiver.230 This would
benefit participants by increasing certainty with regard to what statutes
can be waived, and therefore whether participation in the sandbox is a
worthwhile expenditure of time and money.231 Currently, the N.C. Act
does not offer participants any guidance with regard to which laws may
be waived through participation in the sandbox.232

225. UTAH CODE ANN. §13–55-103 (2020) (requiring applicants to show how
“participating in the regulatory sandbox would enable a successful test of the innovative
product or service); FLA. STAT. § 559.952 (2020) (requiring applicants to list the laws which
prevent the innovative product or service from being offered); KY. ACTS § 147 (2019)
(requiring applicants to state why the innovation is currently prohibited by regulation); NV
S.B. 161 (requiring applicants to state the manner in which participation in the program will
facilitate a successful test of the product or service).
226. See UK FIN CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox Application.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Victor Chatenay, More Than One Fifth of Fintechs in the UK Regulator’s
Sandbox Have Collapsed, INSIDER INTEL. (Apr. 27,
2021), https://www.emarketer.com/content/more-than-one-fifth-of-Fintechs-uk-regulator-ssandbox-have-collapsed [https://perma.cc/X5A6-3KGG] (demonstrating through more
recent statistics that participants in the sandbox are more likely to survive the first few years,
which is the most vulnerable time for a new business. As of April, 2021, 22% of
participants in the UK’s sandbox participants had failed. In comparison, 60% of all new
businesses that start in the UK will fail within the first three years).
230. FLA. STAT. § 559.952 (2020).
231. O’Sullivan, supra note 7.
232. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-7.
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In other jurisdictions, applicants can request a declaratory
statement about whether existing regulations would apply to their firm,
and therefore whether they would stand to benefit from participating.233
The N.C. Innovation Council could provide applicants with a declaratory
statement listing specific rules and provisions that would not be
applicable to the participant during the sandbox period.234 Some of these
rules may be licensure requirements that are ordinarily imposed on
companies who want to operate in the state as a financial services or
money transmitter firm.235 For instance, some provisions may exempt
firms from some quarterly reporting requirements, exempt some
activities from licensure, and create exemptions from certain fees.236
However, these jurisdictions also require the applicant to include in their
request for a declaratory statement the specific statute that they believe
should be waived.237 Other jurisdictions have included language which
makes it clear to participants that the relevant sandbox authority will not
provide “horizon scanning” for all possible regulations that might be
applicable to a business.238
By providing participating firms with a declaratory statement
listing which rules and regulations can be waived, the Innovation Council
could make participation in North Carolina’s sandbox more attractive and
could avoid some of the issues that could depress participation in the
sandbox.239 For example, if the criteria for admissions is as burdensome
as the regulations themselves, and if firms are uncertain whether the
regulations can actually be waived, then the sandbox is not offering firms
an advantage.240 A declaratory statement would provide greater certainty
and clarity to applicants, and help them determine what they have to gain
from the sandbox and whether this benefit is worth the cost of
admission.241 In addition, the Innovation Council should incorporate the
requirement that participants include in their request for a declaratory

233. § 559.952.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. § 559.952(4a).
237. Id.
238. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA Regulatory Sandbox Application Guide (2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/information-sheets/fca-regulatory-sandbox-applicationguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD7S-WGJJ].
239. O’Sullivan, supra note 7.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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statement the specific statute or rule that they think should be waived.242
By requiring applicants to specify which rules they believe may be
eligible for waiver, the burden on the Innovation Council can be
reduced.243
E.

Clarify the Possibility of an Extension

The N.C. Act could also be improved by clarifying the process of
requesting an extension of the sandbox period.244 Although the N.C. Act
provides for the possibility of a twelve-month extension of a firm’s
participation in the sandbox, more specific language would be helpful.245
For instance, the N.C. Act does not explicitly limit firms to a single
twelve-month extension; this restriction must be inferred from the
wording of the statute.246 In addition, the N.C. Act does not establish
requirements that participants must satisfy before extension requests may
be granted by the Innovation Council.247
Other sandbox programs are more explicit in the renewal process,
and impose heightened requirements on firms who want to take
advantage of this possibility. For instance, some sandbox programs
clearly limit applicants to a single renewal.248 These programs may also
impose requirements on applicants before they may take advantage of an
extension.249 An applicant may be required to show that either (1) a law
must be amended for the firm to legally offer the product, or (2) the
applicant has submitted an application for licensure and it is pending.250
Limiting firms to a single extension and requiring firms to meet
these requirements can have several benefits.251 Allowing only a single
extension increases clarity and predictability for firms and regulators

242. FLA. STAT. § 559.952 (2020).
243. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 3.
244. See Reiners, supra note 4 (suggesting that sandbox extensions should be limited
to one year or less).
245. Id.
246. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-7(a) (emphasis added) (contemplating
that the duration of participation in the sandbox is “not to exceed 24 months from the date of
admission into the regulatory sandbox program unless an extension is granted.”).
247. Id.
248. FLA. STAT. § 559.952(7)(a) (2020).
249. § 559.952(7)(b).
250. Id.
251. Reiners, supra note 4.
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alike.252 In addition, requiring firms to show that they have already
submitted a licensure application will preclude extensions for participants
who are overly-reliant on the sandbox and do not have a realistic pathway
to regulatory compliance.253 This will incentivize participating firms to
file an application for licensure, which will keep them focused on the
long-term goal of viability outside the sandbox.254
F.

Require Bi-annual Reports

The N.C. Act should also follow the lead of other jurisdictions
and require participants to submit a report twice per year while they are
in the program.255 Other sandbox programs require participants to report
financial information and the number of consumers who have received
the financial product or service.256 In contrast, the N.C. Act requires a
report at the end of the sandbox period, and the contents of the report are
determined by the applicable state agency.257
Requiring bi-annual reports will be an easy way for the regulatory
agencies to gather up-to-date information about each firm’s progress in
the sandbox.258 Frequent reports could also minimize the potential harm
to consumers by enabling the Innovation Council to keep a closer eye on
firms and take preventative steps sooner than otherwise possible.
G.

Emphasize the Value of Partnerships

One final way that the sandbox program that could be improved
upon is by instilling an emphasis on the importance of partnerships to a
firm’s success.259 Other jurisdictions acknowledge in the application
process that many firms will need to partner with an established company
in order to successfully test their innovation.260 These jurisdictions also
make it clear to applicants that while partnering with an incumbent is
often beneficial, the sandbox administrator will not assist applicants in
252. See id. (recommending that the N.C. Act be explicit about limiting participants
to a single extension, because the Act is unclear as written).
253. § 559.952.
254. Id.
255. O’Sullivan, supra note 7.
256. Id. at 3.
257. N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-7(c).
258. O’Sullivan, supra note 7, at 4.
259. Id. at 2.
260. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., Regulatory Sandbox Application.
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finding potential partners.261
This enables applicants in these
jurisdictions to make a fully informed choice about whether or not to
participate based on clear disclosures of what the program does and does
not offer.262
In its current state, the N.C. Act is silent on the issue of
partnerships, and it could be improved by adopting similar language so
that applicants can maximize their experience in the sandbox and have a
clear understanding of the assistance they can expect to receive.263
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the creation of a regulatory sandbox for financial
and insurance technologies in North Carolina will likely be a net positive
for the state’s economy and consumers.264 However, regulatory
sandboxes have their drawbacks; they can result in state endorsement of
harmful and unproven technologies,265 and they have the ability to
weaken existing consumer protections.266 The N.C. Regulatory Sandbox
could specifically be improved by building on the experiences of other
jurisdictions operating similar programs. The N.C. Act would benefit
from adding a collaborative application process, providing applicants
with a declaratory statement, requiring a proof of concept and bi-annual
reports from applicants, emphasizing the importance of partnerships, and
increasing the clarity of extension opportunities. The Innovation Council
could implement some of these changes through its discretionary
authority, but other changes likely must be made by amendment to the
statute by the state legislature. One path forward is for the Innovation
Council to operate the program for several years and then, armed with
additional practical experience, reexamine fundamental aspects of the
N.C. Act. In this way, the Council can determine if the program’s
structure can be improved to achieve the dual objectives of stimulating
the development of innovation financial products and services while

261. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA Regulatory Sandbox Application Guide; See
UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB. REF.: 00598 at 5 (noting that about fifty percent of the
sandbox tests in the UK involved a partnership between an incumbent and a startup).
262. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PUB REF: 00598.
263. See N.C. Regulatory Sandbox Act § 169-6.
264. Illman & Medlin, supra note 126.
265. Kelly, supra note 151.
266. Reiner, supra note 4.
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protecting consumers. As an experimental concept, the program could
itself benefit from a sandbox-like experience.
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